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SYMPOSIUM ESSAY
COMPLEX VALUE CHOICES AT THE
ENVIRONMENT-ENERGY INTERFACE
Hari M. Osofsky*
During the 2001-02 academic year, I lived in China, teaching U.S. civil
rights law and helping to start a labor law clinic. My first day of teaching
the fall civil rights course was the day of the September 11 attacks, and that
event and reactions to it played a dominant role in my experience of that
year. However, it was also a particularly interesting year to be in China
from an environmental-energy perspective because the Three Gorges Dam
was in the process of being built and brought online.1 At that point, the
area was partially flooded and it was one of the last years that one could
take a standard boat ride through the area. I took a Chinese cruise ship to
look at the site-quite an experience that included an almost non-stop
speaker directing my daily activities-and also visited the Three Gorges
Dam tourist center and a resettled village. I had a number of quiet conver-
sations with people in that village about how the project was affecting their
lives.
The Three Gorges Dam provides a particularly dramatic example of the
complex value choices at the environment-energy interface that are the
focus of this essay. In the panel discussion from which this essay emerges,
we were asked to assess anthropocentric, biocentric, and ecocentric values at
the environment-health interface. However, in the context of the dam, the
value conflicts are not found so much in the comparative valuation of hu-
mans, species, and ecosystems, but rather in the difficult choices among
energy sources that have significant benefits and externalities.
Professor, University of Minnesota Law School; 2013-14 Fesler-Lampert Chair in
Urban and Regional Affairs; Director, Joint Degree Program in Law, Science & Technology;
Faculty Member, Conservation Biology Graduate Program; Adjunct Professor, Department
of Geography, Environment and Society; and Fellow, Institute on the Environment. I would
like to thank the student organizers of the conference, especially Jamen Tyler, as well as
Professor David Uhlmann and Jenny Rickard, for all of their wonderful planning and for
including and assisting me. I also appreciated the thoughtful reflections of my co-panelists,
Tracy Bach and Zygmunt Plater, and the very helpful editorial work of Jamen Tyler, Na-
thaniel Boesch, Jack Battaglia, and Brianna Iddings of the Michigan Journal of Environmental
& Administrative Law. As always, I am grateful for the love, support, and patience of Josh,
Oz, and Scarlet Gitelson.
1. For a description of the Three Gorges Dam, see sources cited infra notes 2-5.
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On the one hand, the Three Gorges Dam embodies everything that en-
vironmentalists have criticized dams for over the years. The dam has had
major ecological and environmental impacts (e.g., erosion, sedimentation,
landslides, wildlife impacts, pollution), displaced approximately 1.4 million
people, and flooded significant cultural and archeological sites.2
On the other hand, its production of electricity is replacing significant
amounts of coal use and its accompanying greenhouse gas emissions. The
Chinese government estimates that the dam's electricity reduces the coun-
try's carbon dioxide emissions by 100 million tons by avoiding 50 million
tons of coal consumption per year.' While there have been some recent
analyses indicating that dams may produce more greenhouse gases than
previously estimated due to methane from decomposing organic matter in
the pools of water that they create, the dam is certainly preventing some of
the serious environmental and health consequences that would have come
with the additional coal mining and burning.4
This dilemma of environment-energy decisions that have major posi-
tives and negatives from either a health or ecosystem perspective poses an
important ethical challenge that this essay explores. Namely, in many cases,
one can value humans, species, and ecosystems, and still not be able to
resolve the best way forward. The essay focuses in particular on a core
problem at the environment-energy interface, of which the Three Gorges
Dam is just one example: people demand cheap and reliable energy, which
pushes us towards new technology or the massive expansion of existing
technology, both of which carry risks and possibilities for a cleaner future.
The essay considers this dilemma in the U.S. context with respect to a
wide range of emerging technologies at the energy-environment interface,
each of which poses its own unique challenges. At times, such as with re-
spect to deepwater drilling and hydraulic fracturing, the key issue is the
most appropriate way to constrain risk. In other situations, including ones
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Gina McCarthy
discussed in her opening keynote, the technology has the potential to limit
risk but is still quite experimental and expensive. For example, the pro-
posed EPA rule to regulate carbon pollution from power plants includes
2. The Chinese government has acknowledged these concerns. See Michael Wines,
China Admits Problems with Three Gorges Dam, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/world/asia/20gorges.html?_r=0 /20gorges.html?_r=1&.
For further discussion of the relocation issues, see Brooke Wilmsen et al., Development for
Whom? Rural to Urban Resettlement at Three Gorges Dam, China, 35 ASIAN STUDIES REV. 21,
22 (2011).
3. See Three Gorges Project Helps Cut Emissions, GOV.CN (Dec. 21, 2007), http://engli
sh.gov.cn/2007-12/21/content_854708.htm.
4. See Huai Chen et al., Methane Emissions from the Surface of the Three Gorges Reser-
voir, 116 J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. (2011), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029
/2011JD016244/abstract.
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partial carbon sequestration and storage. This decision represents a com-
promise between the most emissions-limiting option and technological and
economic reality.5
The essay uses examples from the energy transition context to explore
questions of uncertainty, federalism, inclusion, and equity. 6 Managing tech-
nological development and expansion is made more difficult by the
messiness of the applicable law and key stakeholders. A diverse set of public
and private actors at multiple levels of government interact with energy
technology, and the authority to regulate it is often divided in somewhat
overlapping ways among different local, state, and federal agencies. Moreo-
ver, in the U.S. context, environmental and energy laws are mostly
regulated separately, under varying statutes and agencies, with inconsistent
federalism arrangements.
The essay analyzes the ways in which complicated value choices inter-
face with hard governance challenges. Part I provides a context for its
analysis by discussing the way in which the demand for cheap, reliable
energy interacts with the development and expansion of risky technology.
Part II then considers how scientific, technological, and legal uncertainty
interact with efforts to create an effective regulatory approach. The essay
concludes in Part III by proposing principles for addressing these complex
value choices more effectively.
I. ENERGY DEMAND AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY
This Part frames the value conundrum of this essay by looking at the
broader context in which energy transition takes place. Although per capita
energy use has declined in recent years'-due to both the recession and
increased energy efficiency-total U.S. demand for energy has continued to
rise steadily over time as population has grown. The following diagram
from the U.S. Energy Information Administration illustrates the more than
5. See Gina McCarthy, Keynote Remarks at the University of Michigan Environmental
Law and Public Health Conference, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 243 (2014).
6. I first focused on these four governance challenges in the context of the British
Petroleum Deepwater Horizon oil spill and draw from that analysis here. Hari M. Osofsky,
Multidimensional Governance and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 63 FLA. L. REv. 1077,
1077 (2011).
7. See Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 MD.
L. REV. 773 (2013), and Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1 (describing these federalism and governance challenges and exploring
the possibilities for hybrid regional governance approaches to help address them).
8. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY REVIEW 2011, at 12 (2012).
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doubling of energy production and consumption in the United States since
the middle of the twentieth century.
U.S. Primary Energy Production, Consumption, mports, and Exports, 1949-2011
From top right to bottom right, the lines represent Consumption, Production, Imports, and Exports
This demand has been paired with technological developments like
deepwater drilling, horizontal drilling, and hydraulic fracturing that have
allowed access to previously inaccessible domestic oil and gas resources.
The Energy Information Administration's 2014 Energy Outlook predicts
that crude oil production will hit its historic 1970 high in 2016 before de-
clining, while natural gas will continue to steadily rise.10
Although renewable energy use has grown over recent years, it still repre-
sents a small fraction of overall energy sources. The core fossil fuels-oil,
natural gas, and coal-provide 82 percent of energy for consumption in this
country, with nuclear power making up another 8 percent. In addition, despite
all the attention given to wind and solar energy, and their increasing financial
viability, dams like the one highlighted in the introduction still make up more
than one-third of the limited U.S. renewable energy production."
9. See Energy Perspectives 1949 2011, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 27, 2012),
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/perspectives.cfm (showing U.S. production,
consumption, imports, and exports of energy since 1949).
10. Increased Tight Oil Production, Vehicle Efficiency Reduce Petroleum and Liquid Imports,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail
.cfm?id=14211. See also INTL. ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012, at 49, 75-
76 (2012) (explaining that the rapid expansion of U.S. shale gas and oil production, which
may allow the United States to become a net exporter); U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO AIR REGULATIONS FOR THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS
INDUSTRY: FACT SHEET, available at http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20110728
factsheet.pdf (describing the massive expansion of fracturing techniques).
11. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, as of 2011, the core
sources of energy were: petroleum (36%), natural gas (26%), coal (20%), renewable energy
(9%), and nuclear (8%). The 9% of renewable energy was comprised of: hydroelectric power
264 [Vol. 3:2
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Our heavy reliance on fossil fuels and desire for energy independence
has created ongoing pressure to continue to expand the use of these new
technologies to access domestic oil and natural gas. Given this reality and
the unlikelihood of a ban on these new practices, an important question is
how key stakeholders can limit their risks to ecosystems and health. The
rest of this essay explores the ethical and regulatory challenges for such
efforts.
II. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SCIENTIFIC,
TECHNOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL UNCERTAINTY
This Part considers the ways in which scientific, technological, and le-
gal uncertainty creates both regulatory and ethical challenges. These
challenges come not only from the uncertainty itself, but also from the
broader governance and justice context in which these issues arise. Often
multiple governmental entities at more than one level of government have
partial regulatory authority. This simultaneous overlap and fragmentation of
authority can exacerbate justice concerns-stemming from the underlying
unequal distribution of environmental and energy benefits and risks-as
each agency's justice mandate may at times be lost in complex public and
private arrangements.12 This Part begins by examining the uncertainty that
arises in these contexts, and then considers these broader governance and
justice questions.
When scientific and technological understanding evolves rapidly, un-
certainty exists. Some uncertainty simply cannot be eliminated. For
example, in the context of climate change, although a very high level of
consensus exists that anthropogenic emissions are causing a wide variety of
impacts, mapping the detailed pathways of causation-especially at smaller
spatial and temporal scales-can be vexing. However, these details often
become relevant in legal contexts; it would assist regulators to know exactly
which impacts result from which emissions, or whether the increased risk of
severe weather events triggered a particular weather event. Instead, climate
change regulation must proceed along precautionary lines, mitigating to try
to limit impacts and taking adaptation measures to address the greatest
risks of impacts. Even if one moves beyond the politicized debates over
climate science in the United States to ask how to manage the risks most
appropriately, areas of reasonable disagreement over strategies exist."
(35%), wood (22%), biofuels (21%), wind (13%), waste (5%), geothermal (2%), and solar/PV
(2%). Energy Perspectives 1949-2011, supra note 9.
12. I have explored this confluence in depth in the context of the BP Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. See Osofsky, supra note 6.
13. See COMM. ON STRATEGIC ADVICE ON THE U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCI.
PROGRAM, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, EVALUATING PROGRESS OF THE U.S. CLIMATE
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In the context of the hot-button issues of deepwater drilling and hy-
draulic fracturing, the emergence and expansion of technology creates the
uncertainties around risks from the technology itself that regulators must
manage. Deepwater drilling operates miles below the surface where tem-
perature and pressure issues create many unknowns, and ultra-deepwater
drilling has developed rapidly over the past decade. 14 At each stage of the
choices that led to the massive BP Deepwater Horizon spill, corporate
decisionmakers with limited governmental oversight balanced risk against
the desire to have the project move forward. When problems arose-a
formation that did not allow them to drill as deeply as planned, issues
around casing choices, tests suggesting cement instability, procedures that
revealed the beginnings of a blowout-key corporate decisionmakers at BP
and its subcontractors decided to rework computer models or dismiss find-
ings in order to keep the project moving forward. " Although many
regulatory reforms took place in the aftermath of the spill to try to ensure
that better oversight would occur in the future, the fast pace of technologi-
cal change in this area paired with the multiplicity of relevant agencies and
limited agency funding makes effective prescriptive regulation difficult. 16
Moreover, once the spill took place, hard questions arose about how to
stop it and how to limit the effects of the oil. Incorrect assessments about
the quantity and rate of oil flowing from the site and limited government
ability to access the site or second-guess BP's estimates helped contribute to
failures to contain the spill. The key corporate and governmental actors
CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM: METHODS AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS 5 (2007), available at
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?isbn=0309108268 ("Information at regional and local
scales is most relevant for state and local resource managers and policy makers, as well as for
the general population, but progress on these smaller spatial scales has been inadequate.
Improving understanding of regional-scale climate processes and their impacts in North
America, for example, would require improved integrated modeling, regional-scale observa-
tions, and the development of scenarios of climate change and impacts."); Patrick J. Bartlein,
Professor, Dep't of Geography, Univ. of Or., Remarks at Seminar on Reading the Fourth
IPCC Assessment Report 2007 (Oct. 17, 2007) (author's notes, on file with author). I have
explored these issues in depth in Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change "International"? Litiga-
tion's Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 585 (2009).
14. For a description of the expansion of deepwater drilling, see CURRY L. HAGERTY
& JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REPORT No. R41262, DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL: SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 26 (July 30, 2010), available at
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf. See also Production, Proved Reserves and Drilling in
Ultra-Deepwater Gulf of Mexico, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., at fig.2 (May 26, 2010),
http://www.eia.gov/oog/info/twip/twiparch/100526/twipprint.html.
15. For a discussion of the systematic failures that caused the spill, see NAT'L COMM.
ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE
GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING (2011) [hereinafter NAT'L
COMM. REPORT], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-OILCOMMISSION/
pdf/GPO-OILCOMMISSION.pdf.
16. Id. at 72-76, 174-75.
266 [Vol. 3:2
Complex Value Choices at the Environment-Energy Interface
desperately wanted to stop the oil flow, but struggled for critical weeks with
a lack of technological ability to do so. The difficulties did not stop with
the spill itself. Currents, storms, and the less-than-pristine onshore and
offshore conditions made it hard to predict the oil's path and determine its
impacts with precision. Because dispersants had never been used in such
large quantities or in such deep water, major disagreements took place over
the appropriate way to deploy them. Furthermore, as the long-term after-
math of the 1989 Exxon Valdez spill has revealed, many of the harms from
the oil and dispersants to ecosystems and humans will only become clearer
over decades."
Hydraulic fracturing does not take place at such extreme depths and
has existed for some time, but its rapid expansion due to developments in
horizontal drilling technology creates difficult questions around risk. As
with deepwater drilling, the pace of development makes it hard for regula-
tors to keep up. An activity like hydraulic fracturing, where the risks are
manageable at small scales, may create much more significant impacts at
larger scales. Moreover, because hydraulic fracturing, unlike deepwater
drilling, often takes place on private land and under state and local regula-
tion, responses to the uncertainty differ based on reactions in those places.
These varying state and local approaches have led to a patchwork approach
to regulating hydraulic fracturing. Not only do states take approaches that
diverge at times from one another, but localities within states that allow
hydraulic fracturing have attempted to ban it. This regulatory variation
paired with the massive increase in drilling over a short period of time-
with many relevant state laws developed when there was much less activity
to regulate-creates uncertainties which make consistent and appropriate
risk management difficult.'
Even when the technological developments are ones intended to ad-
dress risks or harms, uncertainty creates governance concerns; regulators
17. Id. at 129-71; Decision-Making Within the Unified Command 12 (Nat'1 Comm. on
the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill & Offshore Drilling, Staff Working Paper No. 2,
2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/WorkingPap
erUnifiedCommandForRelease.pdf.
18. NAT'L COMM. REPORT, supra note 15, at 140-213. Accord Christopher M. Reddy et
al., Composition and Fate of Gas and Oil Released to the Water Column During the Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill, PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SC. (EARLY EDITION), July 18, 2011, available at
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/07/15/1101242108.full.pdf+html?with-ds=yes; Stan-
ley D. Rice, Persistence, Toxicity, and Long-Term Environmental Impact of the Exxon Valdez Oil
Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 55, 59-67 (2009); Press Release, Nat'l Sci. Found., Chemical
Make-up of Gulf of Mexico Plume Determined (July 18, 2011), available at
http://www.nsf.gov/news/news-summ.jsp?cntn-id=120962&WT.mc-id=USNSF_51&WT.m
c ev=click.
19. For a more in-depth discussion of these issues, see Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid
Energy Governance, supra note 7; Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory Diseconomies of
Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 237 (2014).
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often struggle with determining when it is appropriate to require an emerg-
ing technology. For example, as noted in the introduction, the EPA has had
to decide whether carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) technology is
well enough developed in an affordable form to require coal-fired power
plants to use it. Its choice to include partial CCS-which reflects the con-
fluence of the current state of technology with economic realities-is tech-
technology forcing, but will not control emissions as well as more complete
CCS might have. With either form, the newness of the technology means
that questions remain about how effective it will be in the long term and
what risks it carries. 20
For some technologies, hard choices exist about whether the risk of us-
ing it is worse than the risk of not using it. Debates over attempting
geoengineering to reverse climate change or its impacts represent a prime
example of such a dilemma. 21 As it becomes increasingly apparent that we
will not mitigate adequately to prevent significant impacts from climate
change, scientists and the public have begun to take more seriously not only
the need for adaptation, but also whether the problem could be solved
technologically. However, major uncertainties exist about whether the
leading strategies to reverse climate change will work, with some scientists
22
claiming that they can only be truly tested through full implementation.
Some techniques also raise major intergenerational justice questions. For
instance, solar radiation management, the leading technique of which in-
volves injecting particles into the atmosphere, only treats the warming of
the atmosphere and not the concentrations of greenhouse gases. If the
practice were started without accompanying mitigation, even more rapid
climate change would occur if it were stopped, tying future generations to
this choice.23
20. For a discussion of these issues as well as property rights concerns, see Alexandra
B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Climate Change, Carbon Sequestration, and Property Rights,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 363; Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Carbon Capture and
Sequestration: Identifying and Managing Risks, 8 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, no. 3, art. 1,
2009.
21. For example, the Co-Chairs of Working Groups 1, 11, and III of the Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicated in their proposal for an IPCC expert
meeting that "geoengineering itself may constitute 'dangerous anthropogenic interference
with the climate system' " under Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], The IPCC Fifth
Assessment Report (ARS): Proposal for an IPCC Expert Meeting on Geoengineering, at 1, IPCC
Doc. IPCC-XXXII/Doc.5, (Oct. 11-14, 2010). See also Hari M. Osofsky, Technology Transfer
and Climate Change, in SUSTAINABLE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: A GUIDE TO GLOBAL AID &
TRADE DEVELOPMENT 177 (2011).
22. Alan Robock et al., A Test for Geoengineering?, 327 SCIENCE 530 (2010).
23. William C.G. Burns, Climate Geoengineering: Solar Radiation Management and its
Implications for Intergenerational Equity, 4 STAN. J.L. SCI. & POL'Y 37, 47-48 (2011), available
268 [Vol. 3:2
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Finally, as noted at the start of this Part, while the challenges of rapidly
evolving technology are difficult, their interconnection with governance
concerns make them even harder. Strategies for responding to scientific and
technological uncertainty and change will interact with simultaneous over-
lap and fragmentation in the regulatory system, the tension between inclu-
inclusion of key stakeholders and efficient decisionmaking, and the unequal
distribution of environmental and energy benefits and harms.
Moreover, there is no "one size fits all" way to address these concerns.
Different formulations of uncertainties and of governance and justice prob-
lems take place across many issues that bridge the energy-environment
divide. Even with respect to any one of these issues, the particular concerns
at a specific point in time will vary based on geography and circumstances.
For instance, deepwater drilling regulation is largely federalized and so an
important governance challenge involves bringing together multiple federal
agencies with other key stakeholders, like state and local governments,
corporations, and community groups. In the aftermath of the BP Deep-
water Horizon oil spill, significant justice concerns arose in numerous
specific contexts, such as the disproportionate disposal of waste near low-
income communities of color.2 4 Hydraulic fracturing, on the other hand,
struggles with the piecemeal quality of state-by-state regulation and of local
bans on the practice within states that allow it. Particular communities also
often have safety and justice concerns related to the way in which drilling is
operationalized in that place within its geographical and geological con-
tours. 25
However, even with the need to consider nuanced specifics, this essay
argues that there are some principles for navigating these value dilemmas
that can help with the many different issues arising in energy transition.
The next Part explores these principles and their possibilities.
III. NAVIGATING VALUES IN MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS
This Part concludes the essay by proposing principles for crafting inno-
vative institutional structures that can help key stakeholders navigate these
hard governance and value problems better at the intersection of energy,
environment, and health. In so doing, it draws from my prior work on the
BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and my collaborative work on energy feder-
at http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjlsp/cgi-bin/orange-web/users-images/pdfs/61_Burns%20
Final.pdf.
24. See generally Osofsky, supra note 6 (describing the aftermath of the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill).
25. Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 7.
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alism and governance with Hannah Wiseman.26 These principles do not
eliminate the underlying complexity of the problems, but they provide
pathways for managing it better.
First, hybrid structures may help to bring together the various overlap-
ping formal and informal regulatory vehicles and numerous public and
private stakeholders. By hybrid structures, I mean those that combine mul-
tiple institutions or actors, often across levels of governance and the
public/private divide. For example, in the context of oil spills, the Regional
Citizens Advisory Councils (RCACs) created in Alaska following the Exx-
on Valdez spill allow many governmental and nongovernmental
stakeholders to provide input into spill prevention. 27 These types of struc-
tures exist in many contexts relevant to the environment-energy
intersection, and Hannah Wiseman and I have argued that they seem to
make some difference in allowing for progress in energy transition.28
Hybridity is a potentially effective strategy for addressing the challeng-
es described in Part II because it helps bridge fragmented authority and
bring key actors to the table. In so doing, such structures can help make
sure that private scientific and technical knowledge infuses public deci-
sionmaking processes and includes voices from disproportionately impacted
communities. While combining public and private actors must be done
carefully to prevent regulatory capture-in which private interested parties
inappropriately influence public decisions-it can help to bridge some of
the divides discussed in the prior parts.29
Second, such structures need to allow key actors at each level of gov-
ernance and across levels to interact meaningfully and effectively. As
described above, in the context of the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and
so many of the other issues at the energy-environment interface, important
regulatory authority is divided among local, state, national, and internation-
al levels. In addition, at each of these levels, many different entities often
have partial authority. This fragmentation not only creates problems of
incomplete, overlapping ability to regulate, but can exacerbate justice prob-
26. Osofsky, supra note 6; Osofsky & Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, supra note
7; Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 7.
27. For an in-depth description of these Regional Citizens Advisory Councils, see
George J. Busenberg, Regional Citizens' Advisory Councils and Collaborative Environmen-
tal Management in the Marine Oil Trade of Alaska (Sept. 1, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p41678_index.html (analyzing
the two advisory councils' contributions); What We Do, COOK INLET REGIONAL CITIZENS
ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.circac.org/what-we-do/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014); About
Us, PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND REGIONAL CITIZENS' ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.pws
rcac.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2014).
28. Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 7.
29. See id.
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lems. Even if individual agencies work hard to comport with environmental
justice mandates, multi-agency groupings may do so less effectively. o
Hybrid structures that bridge these levels of authority may help to ac-
complish these goals. By bringing together relevant entities at each level
with key nongovernmental and corporate stakeholders, they can help to
ensure that regulatory authority gets coordinated or, at the very least, can
provide a space in which conflict might be addressed. Hannah Wiseman's
and my work on energy transition suggests that the regional level often
serves as a helpful space for creating these bridges between smaller and
larger governmental entities."
Finally, these hybrid multiscalar structures need to be systematically
aware of and responsive to change. Scientific understanding and technology
is moving quickly with respect to sources of energy and other aspects of the
energy system. As the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill and the debates over
how to regulate hydraulic fracturing indicate, our prescriptive regulatory
structures often struggle to evolve quickly enough. Moreover, throughout
the regulatory system, key people may face challenges regarding whether
they have or how they should obtain adequate expertise to make assess-
ments. For example, in the context of climate change, judges have grappled
with whether they can assess the science.32
Hybrid structures can assist with this responsiveness through their in-
clusion of diverse stakeholders across levels. For example, Professor George
Busenberg's study of RCACs concludes that "the councils have operated as
institutional learning arrangements (by promoting the application of new
ideas and information to policy decisions in this system)" and collaborating
with other key institutions." In our broader work on energy transition, Han-
nah Wiseman and I have found a pattern across these kinds of institutions in
their innovative and often constructive efforts to respond to evolving needs.
In the final analysis, the confluence of energy and environment is rife
with hard choices, particularly if we are realistic about energy demand and
the entrenchment of fossil fuels. The rapid development of both hydraulic
fracturing and deepwater drilling will likely continue. The EPA faces ongo-
ing challenges in its efforts to require power plants to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions, including its proposal to require coal-fired power plants to
30. Osofsky, supra note 6 at 1110-15; Hari M. Osofsky, Kate Baxter-Kauf, Bradley
Hammer, Ann Mailander, Brett Mares, Amy Pikovsky, Andrew Whitney & Laura Wilson,
Environmental Justice and the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 20 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 99, 106
(2012).
31. See Osofsky & Wiseman, Hybrid Energy Governance, supra note 7.
32. For example, in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court
explains that "[flederal judges lack the scientific, economic, and technological resources an
agency can utilize in coping with issues of this order." 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2539-40 (2011).
33. Busenberg, supra note 27, at 18-19.
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use partial CCS. Experts continue to debate the repercussions of the Three
Gorges Dam and hydropower more broadly, as new technology increasingly
allows the pairing of hydropower with hydrokinetic projects. For example,
in 2009, the first federally licensed hydrokinetic project, using flow from
the output channel from a dam, began operating commercially in my state
of Minnesota. 4
However, a principled approach to the governance and value challenges
at the confluence of environment and energy is critical as our system con-
tinues to transition. Institutions that model hybridity, multiscalar inclusion,
and regulatory responsiveness can help to overcome governance challenges
and frame value dilemmas appropriately. More development and assess-
ment of such institutions is needed for the hard choices ahead.
34. See U.S. Dep't of Energy, First US. Hydrokinetic Project Begins Commercial Opera-
tions, EERE NEWS, Aug. 26, 2009, http://apps1.eere.energy.gov/news/news-detail.cfm/new
s id=14859.
272 [Vol. 3:2
